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ABSTRACT
We present a study on the efficacy of adversarial training on trans-
former neural network models, with respect to the task of de-
tecting check-worthy claims. In this work, we introduce the first
adversarially-regularized, transformer-based claim spotter model
that achieves state-of-the-art results on multiple challenging bench-
marks. We obtain a 4.70 point F1-score improvement over current
state-of-the-art models on the ClaimBuster Dataset and CLEF2019
Dataset, respectively. In the process, we propose a method to apply
adversarial training to transformer models, which has the potential
to be generalized to many similar text classification tasks. Along
with our results, we are releasing our codebase and manually la-
beled datasets. We also showcase our models’ real world usage via
a live public API. 14
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1 INTRODUCTION
The creation and propagation of misinformation has become an
increasingly important issue for our society to tackle. Today, many
falsehoods are spread via mediums that allow quick dissemination
of information, including social media, news outlets, and televised
programs. The distribution of objectively incorrect information can
negatively impact the operation of our society in many spheres.
Especially in the realm of political discourse, misinformation can
shake public confidence in government institutions, 1 erroneously
inform political judgements [2], and reinforce confidence in wrong
information [6].
In recent years, the number of fact-checking outlets has grown
from 44 in 2014 to 226 in 2019 2 as part of a global movement
to suppress misinformation. These outlets, including PolitiFact, 3
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Fall 2020.
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authorship.
1 https://pewrsr.ch/2HoH0au 2 https://reporterslab.org/tag/fact-checking-database/
3 https://www.politifact.com/
Snopes, 4 and FactCheck.org, 5 hire human fact-checkers to perform
claim-checking, a process in which they vet factual claims by review-
ing relevant source documents and interviewing subject experts.
In addition to outlets that directly fact-check claims, there exist
many projects that use computing to aid fact-checkers in dissemi-
nating information to the general public, including Schema.org’s
ClaimReview 6 which organizes fact-checks into a unified data-
base; FactStream 7 which compiles fact-checks into a smartphone
application; and Fatima, 8 a bot built by Aos Fatos, a Brazilian fact-
checking organization, that scans Twitter for tweets containing
already-debunked misinformation and refers readers to relevant
fact-checks. These organizations and projects play a central role in
fighting misinformation, as fact-checks are effective not only for
debunking false claims but also deterring speakers from making
false claims in the future [33].
However, due to the intense time commitment demanded by
fact-checking, combined with the rapid rate at which new content
surfaces via modern media channels, many problematic claims go
unnoticed and unchecked [35]. These challenges present an op-
portunity for automated fact-checking tools to help fact-checkers
perform their duties. There are several prominent fact-checking
projects that are currently testing automated systems, including
FactChecker 9 which queries knowledge bases, cross-references
known fact-checks, and provides custom ranked Google search
results; ClaimPortal 10 which uses ClaimBuster [15–17, 23] to se-
lect tweets that are worth fact-checking, as well as various algo-
rithms to retrieve relevant articles and pre-existing fact-checks [27];
Squash 11 which fact-checks live debates by converting speech to
text and querying a database of pre-existing fact-checks; Fakta 12
which checks claims against reliable web sources [31]; and Full-
Fact 13 which is developing systems to cluster groups of similar
claims together.
Claim-spotting is a process that precedes claim-checking where
check-worthy claims are spotted from large streams of informa-
tion available from various sources (e.g., newscasts, news websites,
Twitter, Facebook). Claim-spotting is an area that is highly suitable
for machine learning algorithms to tackle. The work presented here
4 https://www.snopes.com/ 5 https://www.factcheck.org/
6 https://schema.org/ClaimReview 7 https://www.factstream.co/
8 https://fatima.aosfatos.org/ 9 https://idir.uta.edu/claimbuster-dev/factchecker/
10 https://idir.uta.edu/claimportal/ 11 https://bit.ly/31YTfnJ 12 https://fakta.app/
13 https://fullfact.org/automated
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Figure 1: A Diagram of Our Current Fact-Checking Framework
focuses on the claim-spotting component of ClaimBuster, 14 which
scores claims based on their check-worthiness. This is paramount
to ensuring that 1) check-worthy factual claims are not missed
by fact-checkers and 2) unimportant or non-factual claims do not
congest fact-checkers’ intellectual bandwidth. To this day, Claim-
Buster’s API is regularly in use not only by internal projects such
as ClaimPortal but also external collaborators such as the Duke
Reporters’ Lab. The closest projects to ClaimBuster in this space are
QCRI’s ClaimRank 15 project, and a component in FullFact’s pro-
posed automated fact-checking system which they gave the name
Hawk in their whitepaper. 16 QCRI’s ClaimRank is very similar
to ClaimBuster in that it ranks claims by assigning them a check-
worthiness score from 0 to 1. As for Hawk and FullFact’s system,
not many details have been released.
Currently, no existing claim-spotter [10, 14–16, 23] has attempted
to apply transformers [45] to the claim-spotting task. The trans-
former is a new deep learning architecture that has recently allowed
for rapid progress and development in the natural language process-
ing field. Particularly, Bidirectional Encoding Representations from
Transformers (BERT) [9] has achieved state-of-the-art performance
on many challenging language understanding and classification
benchmarks. We surmise that BERT’s architecture is suited for our
claim-spotting task. However, BERT models have upwards of 300
million trainable parameters, making them highly susceptible to
overfitting [4], especially on limited amounts of training data. To
address this, we propose to incorporate adversarial training into a
BERT-based model as a regularization technique. Gradient-based
adversarial training [13, 29, 30] is a procedure that trains classifiers
to be resistant to small, approximately worst-case perturbations
to its inputs. It was first applied to computer vision tasks in [13]
and later brought to the NLP domain in Long Short-Term Mem-
ory Networks [19] by Goodfellow et al. [29, 30]. No prior work has
attempted to incorporate this type of adversarial training into trans-
former networks. We are the first to propose this technique, which
is also potentially applicable in many other NLP-related tasks.
Motivated by the above, we introduce the first adversarially-
regularized, transformer-based claim-spotting model that achieves
14 https://idir.uta.edu/claimbuster/api/docs/ 15 https://claimrank.qcri.org/
16 https://bit.ly/31YTsY3
state-of-the-art results on challenging claim-spotting benchmarks.
Our contributions are summarized as follows:
• We are the first to apply gradient-based adversarial training
to transformer networks.
• We present the first transformer-based neural network ar-
chitecture for claim-spotting.
• Our models are the first claim-spotters to be regularized by
gradient-based adversarial training.
• Our models achieve state-of-the-art performance by a sub-
stantial margin on challenging claim-spotting benchmarks.
• We release a public codebase, dataset, and API for both re-
producibility and further development (Section 7).
2 CLAIMBUSTER OVERVIEW
In this section we present a brief history and overview on the Claim-
Buster project. We cover its inception and impact in the community,
as well as the current status of our fact-checking framework.
2.1 ClaimBuster’s History and Current Status
ClaimBuster’s foundation was first established in [16], where Has-
san et. al. first presented results on different machine learning
models trained on an early version of the dataset we are using
currently. This work later evolved into what is currently known
as ClaimBuster and was presented in [15, 17]. Since then, Claim-
Buster has partnered with the Duke Reporters’ Lab (DRL) 17 and
collaborated with them through ClaimBuster’s API. During this
time ClaimBuster’s API has been called over 47, 000, 000 times by
internal projects and over 456, 000 times by the DRL. ClaimPortal is
the internal project that has made the most use of the ClaimBuster
API. It scores tweets and provides relevant fact-checks for tweets
using the claim-matching component seen in Figure 1. Through this
project we have seen that we can successfully apply ClaimBuster
to different domains, such as Twitter. As for the DRL, they generate
and send out a daily e-mail to fact-checkers with the latest top
claims that were identified by ClaimBuster from television and so-
cial media. Through our collaboration with the DRL we have been
able to contribute to which claims are fact-checked by major news
17 https://reporterslab.org/
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outlets. 18 The accessibility of our work has allowed it, in general,
to have a widespread impact in the fact-checking community.
Since the development of the original SVM model, we have been
exploring deep learning [23] approaches to improve our claim-
spotting model. Recently, this culminated with us employing the
BERT architecture due to BERT and its derivative models’ proven
track record in performingwell onNLP related tasks such as SQuAD
and GLUE. 19 20 Since then, we have also re-evaluated our approach
to the classes used within our datasets, how our dataset is generated,
and refined our overall process when it comes to evaluating models.
This turnaround in our approach to our dataset has come after a
lengthy evaluation of our extraction criteria (i.e., what we consider
high-quality labels), and the ratio of check-worthy to non-check-
worthy sentences in the dataset. Through these evaluations, we
are confident we have obtained a better quality dataset than that
used in previous works. The work presented here will also begin a
thorough test period with our collaborators at the DRL.
2.2 Fact-Checking Framework
Figure 1 showcases the current status of our fact-checking frame-
work. We monitor claims from various sources (e.g., Twitter, polit-
ical debates, etc.), and we are even able to process live television
closed-caption feeds for important events such as presidential de-
bates. ClaimSpotter then handles scoring all of the claims that our
claim monitoring system captures. ClaimSpotter is accessible to the
public via an API, which only requires a free API key 21 to access.
We are deploying the deep learning models for the public and other
researchers to test and verify the models presented in this paper.
Each deep-learning model is running off of a dedicated Nvidia GTX
1080Ti. All resources are running on the same network, so there is
no significant overhead added by a server to server communication.
In addition, we also have a repository of fact-checked claims
which we use in conjunction with ElasticSearch 22 in our claim-
matcher component to verify the veracity of any claims that have
been previously fact-checked by professional fact-checkers. If no
previous fact-checks are found then we can send these claims to our
fact-checking component, which is still being developed. Currently,
our approach is to convert claims to questions [18] in order to
query knowledge bases (e.g., Wolfram, Google, etc.) using natural
language to see if they can generate a clear verdict. This approach
is useful for general knowledge type claims, but nuanced claims
requiring domain-specific knowledge are still very challenging to
handle. Finally, we also provide re-ranked Google search results
which are sorted based on the content of the pages the initial search
query returns. The analysis is based on the Jaccard similarity of
the context surrounding the text in each page that matched the
initial query. Finally, we regularly publish presidential debate check-
worthiness scores during election cycles on our website, 23 and we
also post high-scoring claims on our project’s Twitter account. 24
3 BERT CLAIM SPOTTING MODEL
In this section, we present our approach to integrating adversarial
training into the BERT architecture for the claim spotting task. To
18 https://bit.ly/2vs8Fol 19 https://rajpurkar.github.io/SQuAD-explorer/
20 https://gluebenchmark.com/leaderboard
21 https://idir.uta.edu/claimbuster/api/request/key/ 22 https://www.elastic.co/
23 https://idir.uta.edu/claimbuster/debates 24 https://twitter.com/ClaimBusterTM
the best of our knowledge, our work is the first to apply gradient-
sign adversarial training [13] to transformer networks.
3.1 Preliminaries
3.1.1 Task Definition. Detecting check-worthy factual claims has
been studied as a binary/ternary classification task and a ranking
task, as explained below. In this paper, we evaluate the performance
of our models on the binary and ranking task definitions.
BinaryClassificationTask: In this work a sentencew is classified
as one of two classes, which deviates from the previous definition
used in [15–17, 23].
• Non-Check-Worthy Sentence (NCS): This class includes
sentences that contain subjective or opinion-centered state-
ments, questions, and trivial factual claims (e.g., The sky is
blue).
• Check-Worthy Factual Sentence (CFS): This class con-
tains claims that are both factual and salient to the general
public. They may touch on statistics or historical informa-
tion, among other things.
Ranking Task: To capture the importance of prioritizing the most
check-worthy claims, a check-worthiness score [15] is defined for
each sentence w:
CWS = p(y = CFS | w) (1)
TheCWS score defines a classificationmodel’s predicted probability
that a given claim is in the CFS class.
3.1.2 BERT Language Model. Bidirectional Encoder Representa-
tions from Transformers (BERT) [9] is a transformer-based lan-
guage modeling architecture that has recently achieved state-of-
the-art performance on many language modeling and text classifi-
cation tasks, including the Stanford Question Answering Dataset
(SQuAD) [39] and General Language Understanding Evaluation
(GLUE) [46]. We review BERT’s relevant features below.
Input/Output Representations: Consider an arbitrary training
sentencew with ground-truth label y.w is first tokenized using the
WordPiece Tokenizer [47]. Next, a [CLS] token is prepended to w
to indicate the start of the sentence, a [SEP] token is appended to
w to indicate the end of a sentence, and w is padded to a length of
T = 200 using whitespace. Each resulting token is then converted
into its corresponding index in the WordPiece vocabulary list. This
input vector, denoted x ∈ RT , is passed to the embedding layers.
Three-Part Embeddings: x is first transformed from a sparse bag-
of-words form to a dense vector representation [28] through an
embedding lookup matrix V ∈ RQ×H , where Q is the size of the
WordPiece vocabulary list and H is the embedding dimensionality.
The series of operations that applies V to x is called the token
embedding layer, and its output is given as stok = Vxt , ∀xt ∈
x, where stok ∈ RT×H . Additionally, BERT utilizes an segment
embedding layer that signifies which parts of the input contain the
input sentence, as the end of xmay be paddedwith empty space. The
output of this layer is denoted by sseд ∈ RT×H . Finally, since vanilla
transformers analyze all tokens in parallel and therefore cannot
account for the sequential ordering of words, BERT introduces a
randomly-initialized real-valued signal via the positional embedding
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𝐫𝑎𝑑𝑣[SEP] = −𝜖𝝎[SEP]/ 𝝎[SEP]
𝝎[SEP]
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Figure 2: Our Custom Adversarially Perturbed Claim Spotting Architecture
layer to encode the relative order of words. The output of this layer
is denoted spos ∈ RT×H . The final input, denoted s, is the element-
wise addition of the three separate embedding layers’ outputs: s =
stok + sseд + spos . We denote the vector representation of the t th
token in x to be st ∈ RH .
Transformer Encoder: Using multiple stacked layers of attention
heads [45], the BERT module encodes each input embedding st into
a hidden vector vt ∈ RH , which is a hidden representation that
incorporates context from surrounding words bidirectionally, as
opposed to unidirectional encoders used in OpenAI GPT [37, 38].
Pooling Layer: The pooling layer generates a representation for
the entire sentence by applying a dense layer on top of the [CLS]
token’s hidden representation, resulting in h ∈ RH . This sentence-
level encoding vector can be used to perform many downstream
tasks including claim-spotting.
3.2 Model Architecture
In this section, we outline how BERT is integrated with adversarial
perturbations to create a claim-spotting model. The resultant model
is end-to-end differentiable and trainable by gradient descent [25].
We refer the reader to Figure 2 for illustrations on each of the
architectural components.
3.2.1 Embedding Process. All three embeddings from the BERT ar-
chitecture are carried over: token spos , segment sseд , and positional
spos . Each embedding layer still performs its original function,
transforming a given word x into the embedding representation
s. The key difference in our architecture is the implantation of an
addition gate through which adversarial perturbations radv are
injected into s to create the perturbed embedding s′.
3.2.2 BERT Transformer. Our work harnesses the power of the
BERT architecture which supports transfer learning [20, 36, 37,
44], a process in which weights are loaded from a BERT language
model that was pre-trained on billions of English tokens. Denote
the number of transformer encoder layers as L, the hidden size
as H , and the number of self-attention heads as A. The version
of BERT used is BERTBase (L = 12, A = 12, H = 768), which has
approximately 110-million parameters. Pretrained model weights
for BERT can be found on Google Research’s BERT Repository. 25
25 https://github.com/google-research/bert
3.2.3 Fully-Connected Dense Layer. The dense layer is tasked with
considering the information passed by BERT’s hidden outputs and
determining a classification. To accomplish this, it is implemented
as a fully-connected neural network layer that accepts input h and
returns |k| un-normalized activations in z ∈ R |k | , where k = {0, 1},
z is passed through the softmax normalization function to produce
final output vector yˆ as:
yˆ =
ezi∑
j ∈k ezj
,∀i ∈ k (2)
where each output activation in yˆ represents a classification class.
yˆ will later be used to compute the check-worthiness score CWS
(Equation 1) and compute the predicted classification label as yˆ =
argmax yˆ.
3.3 Standard Optimization Objective Function
In neural networks, an objective function, also known as the cost or
loss function, is a differentiable expression that serves two purposes:
to 1) quantify the disparity between the predicted and ground-truth
probability distributions and 2) provide a function for gradient
descent to minimize. Negative log-likelihood is a highly common
choice for the cost function, because it has a nicely computable
derivative for optimization via backpropagation, among other ad-
vantageous properties [21]. Our standard negative log-likelihood
loss function is formulated as the probability that the model pre-
dicts ground-truth y given embedded inputs s, parameterized by
the model’s weights θ :
Lr eд = − 1
N
N∑
n=1
logp(y(n) | s(n);θ ) (3)
where N is the total number of training examples in a dataset. Lr eд
is used to compute adversarial perturbations in Section 3.4.
3.4 Computing Adversarial Perturbations
Gradient-based adversarial training is a regularization technique
first introduced in [13]. The procedure trains classifiers to be resis-
tant to small perturbations to its inputs. Rather than passing regular
embedded input s into a processing module such as a transformer
or LSTM, adversarial training passes s′ = s+ radv . radv is typically
a norm-constrained vector that modifies the input slightly to force
Gradient-Based Adversarial Training on Transformer Networks for Detecting Check-Worthy Factual Claims Conference’17, July 2017, Washington, DC, USA
the classifier to output incorrect predictions. Then, the disparity be-
tween the ground-truth (y) and perturbed prediction (yˆ′) based on
the perturbed input is minimized through backpropagation, hence
training the model to be resistant to these adversarial perturbations.
We are particularly interested in adversarial training’s potential
as a regularization technique [8, 13, 29, 32, 41, 42], as BERT net-
works are prone to overfitting when being fine-tuned on small
datasets [43]. To the best of our knowledge, we contribute the first
implementation of this technique on transformer networks.
We denote θ as the parameterization of our neural network
and radv as a vector perturbation that is added element-wise to
s before being passed to the transformer encoder. radv can be
computed in several ways. Firstly, random noise may be added to
disrupt the classifier. This is typically formalized as sampling radv
from a Gaussian distribution: radv ∼ N(µ,σ 2). Alternatively, we
can compute perturbations that are adversarial, meaning that they
increase the model’s negative-log-likelihood error (Equation 3) by
the theoretical maximum margin. This achieves the desired effect
of generating a perturbation in the direction in which the model is
most sensitive. In this case, radv is given as:
radv = argmax
r, ∥r∥≤ϵ
− logp(y | s + r;θ ) (4)
where ϵ is a constraint on the perturbation that limits themagnitude
of the perturbation.
In [29], it was shown that random noise is a far weaker regu-
larizer than adversarially-computed perturbations. Therefore, we
adopt adversarial perturbations for our model (Equation 4) and
propose to apply them on the embeddings of the BERT model.
Equation 4 gives the absolute worst-case adversarial perturba-
tion radv given a constraint that ∥r∥ ≤ ϵ . However, this value is
impossible to compute with a closed-form analytic solution in neu-
ral networks; functions such as Equation 3 are neither convex nor
concave in topology. Therefore, we propose a novel technique for
generating approximately worst-case perturbations to the model.
Because BERT embeddings are composed of multiple compo-
nents (Section 3.1.2), it may not be optimal from a regularization
standpoint to compute perturbations w.r.t. s. Therefore, to deter-
mine the optimal perturbation setting, we propose to experiment
with computing radv w.r.t. all possible combinations of the 3 em-
bedding components. There are 7 different possible configurations
in the set of perturbable combinations P, letting S denote the set
of embedding layers:
P = 2S − ∅ where S = {stok , sseд , spos } (5)
Given this list of components that can be perturbed, we denote
sum of the subset of the embeddings we will perturb asm =
∑
x ∈b x
where b ∈ P. We then generate approximate worst-case perturba-
tions by linearizing logp(y | s;θ ) with respect to m. To understand
what this means, consider the simplified example shown in Figure
3, which graphs an example cost function J = − logp(y | s;θ ) with
respect to an example embedding space s. For ease of visualization,
in Figure 3 it is assumed that s exists on a scalar embedding space;
but in reality, our embeddings are in high-dimensional vector space.
The gradient at the point p gives us information regarding which
direction s should be moved to increase the value of J :
∆s ∝ ∂
∂m
logp(y | s;θ ) (6)
However, we must be careful in determining how much s should
be perturbed, because the assumption that J is linear may not hold
in reality. If the perturbation is too large, as with r2, the adversarial
effect will not be achieved, as the value of J will in fact decrease.
However, if we introduce a norm constraint ϵ to limit the perturba-
tions to a reasonable size, linearization can accomplish the task of
approximating a worst-case perturbation, as shown with r1.
Figure 3: Visualization of Linearization
Given the above insight, we generalize the one-dimensional
example (Equation 6) to higher dimensions using the gradient vec-
tor. Therefore, the adversarial perturbation radv is computed with
Equation 7, which can be implemented using backpropagation in
deep neural networks:
radv = −ϵω/∥ω∥2 whereω = ∇m − logp(y | s;θ ) (7)
Since we desire to train our language classification model to
become resistant to the perturbations defined in Equation 7, we
create adversarially-perturbed input embeddings s′ as follows:
s′ = s + radv = stok + sseд + spos + radv (8)
After s′ is passed into the transformer module, predictions will
be generated. These predictions will be used in formulating the
adversarial optimization objective function (Section 3.5).
3.5 Compound Optimization Objective
Our model’s final optimization objective contains two components:
standard loss and adversarial loss. Standard loss was defined in
Equation 3.Adversarial loss optimizes for distributional smoothness,
given by the negative log-likelihood of a model parameterized by θ
predicting y given perturbed input s′:
Ladv = −
1
N
N∑
n=1
logp(y(n) | s(n)′ ;θ ) (9)
where N represents the number of training samples in D.
The final optimization objective is given as the sum of Lr eд and
Ladv . By combining the two losses, gradient descent will optimize
for both distributional smoothness and model accuracy jointly:
min
θ
{
Lr eд + λLadv
}
(10)
where λ is a balancing factor between standard and adversarial loss.
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3.6 Adversarial Training Algorithm
Let θ tok be the parameters of the token embedding lookup table,
θseд be the parameters of the segment embedding layer, and θpos
be the parameters of the positional embedding layer, θn ,∀n < L
be the parameters for each of the L transformer encoder layers,
θpool be the parameterization of the pooling layer, and θ f c be
the weights and biases in the fully-connected dense layer. We also
define F as the number of encoder layers to freeze (i.e. render the
weights uneditable during backpropagation to preserve knowledge
obtained from pre-trained weights), where 0 ≤ F ≤ L.
Algorithm 1: Adversarial Training Loop
Input :Training data D
Initialize θ f c using Xavier method [12];
Load pretrained weights for θ tok , θseд , θpos , θn ,∀n < L;
Set θ tok , θseд , θpos , and θn ,∀n < F to untrainable;
M ← claim-spotting model (Figure 2);
while not converge do
Sample w, y from data D;
Tokenize and process w into x;
Pass x through embeddings to produce s;
▷ Standard forward-propagation
yˆ ←M(s; θ );
Compute Lr eд using y, yˆ (Equation 3);
▷ Generate and apply perturbations
Compute radv using Lr eд ,y (Equation 7);
Compute perturbed input as s′ = s + radv ;
▷ Adversarial forward-propagation
yˆ′ ←M(s′; θ );
Compute Ladv using y, yˆ′ (Equation 9);
▷ Adversarial training
Optimize
{Lr eд + λLadv } (Equation 10);
end
The adversarial training procedure is shown in Algorithm 1. First,
modelM is used to compute the optimization function Lr eд . Then,
Lr eд is used to compute the adversarial perturbation (Equation 7),
which is used to compute the adversarial optimization objective
(Equation 9). This objective is added to the standard objective (Equa-
tion 10) and minimized using gradient descent.
4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
We evaluate our new transformer-based claim-spotting models on
both the Classification and Ranking Tasks (Section 3.1.1). We com-
pare against re-trained and refined versions of past ClaimBuster
models [15, 23] and the top-two performing systems from the 2019
CLEF-CheckThat! Challenge. Table 1 shows several example sen-
tences, their ground-truth labels, and our models’ CWS scores.
4.1 Experiment Setup
4.1.1 Datasets. We use two claim-spotting datasets to evaluate
model performance.
ClaimBuster Dataset (CBD): The ClaimBuster dataset is our own
in-house, manually labeled dataset. A different version of the CBD
was used by [15, 17, 23]. The current CBD consists of two classes,
as mentioned in Section 3.1.1: NCS and CFS. The switch to this
scheme was motivated by our observation that the non-check-
worthy factual sentence class in the previous versions of CBD
was not really useful and possibly negatively impacting models
trained using it. The CBD consists of 9674 sentences (6910 NCS and
2764 CFS). For validation we perform 4-fold cross validation using
this same dataset. The dataset is composed of manually labeled
sentences from all U.S. presidential debates from 1960 to 2016. We
describe the details of dataset collection in Section 7.3.2. This dataset
is publicly available, as noted in Section 7.3.
CLEF2019-CheckThat! Dataset (C2019): We also evaluate our
model on the 2019 CLEF-CheckThat! 26 claim-spotting dataset.
CLEF-CheckThat! is an annual competition that assesses the state-
of-the-art in automated computational fact-checking by providing
datasets for claim-spotting. The C2019 dataset is comprised of po-
litical debate and interview transcripts. Sentences are labelled as
check-worthy only if they were fact-checked by FactCheck.org.
Note that this labelling strategy introduces significant bias into
the dataset, as many problematic claims go unchecked due to the
limited resources of fact-checkers from a single organization (Sec-
tion 1). The training set contains 15,981 non-check-worthy and 440
check-worthy sentences, and the testing set contains 6,943 non-
check-worthy and 136 check-worthy sentences. The C2019 dataset
also includes speaker information for each sentence, which we did
not use in training our models for two reasons: (1) it may introduce
unwanted bias based on the name (or guid if names are masked) of
speaker and (2) it makes the claim spotting model inapplicable to
real-time events since live transcripts typically lack speaker infor-
mation and speakers not present in the training set are likely to be
encountered as well.
4.2 Evaluated Models
CB-BBA: This model is trained using our novel claim-spotting
framework detailed in Section 3.2. It is trained adversarially using
the compound optimization objective defined in Equation 10.
CB-BB: This model is architecturally identical to CB-BBA but is
trained using the standard optimization objective (Equation 3). In
implementation, radv is simply set to 0. This model serves as a
point of comparison for the adversarial model.
CB-BiL: [23] This model is a reimplementation of [23] in Ten-
sorFlow 2.1. It uses normalized GloVe word embeddings 27 and
consists of a bi-directional LSTM layer which allows it to capture
forward and reverse sequence relationships. The model’s binary
cross entropy loss function is optimized using RMSProp.
CB-SVM: [15, 16] The SVM classifier uses a linear kernel. The
feature-vector used to represent each sentence is composed of a
tf-idf weighted bag-of-unigrams vector, part-of-speech vector, and
sentence length (i.e., number of words). The total number of features
for each sentence using our dataset is 6980. The core SVM model is
produced using scikit-learn’s LinearSVC class with the max number
26 https://sites.google.com/view/clef2019-checkthat/
27 https://nlp.stanford.edu/projects/glove/
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Table 1: Sample Sentences, Labels, and Check-Worthiness Scores
Claim Label CB-SVM CWS Score CB-BBA CWS Score
The U.S. loses millions of lives each year to homicide. CFS 0.6000 0.9999
I really think you’re overthinking the situation. NCS 0.2178 5.8515 × 10−5
of iterations set to an arbitrary high number (10000000), to ensure
model convergence.
4.2.1 2019 CLEF-CheckThat! Models. Neither of the top two teams
in CLEF2019 released their code; therefore, we are only able to
retrieve their results on CLEF2019.
Copenhagen [14]: Team Copenhagen’s model, the top performer
on C2019, consisted of an LSTM model [19] token embeddings
fused with syntactic-dependency embeddings. To train their model,
Copenhagen did not use the C2019 dataset, instead using an external
dataset of Clinton/Trump debates that was weakly labeled using
our ClaimBuster API. 14
TheEarthIsFlat [10]: TheEarthIsFlat, the second-place performer,
used a feed-forward neural network trained on the C2019 dataset.
They encoded sentences using the Universal Sentence Encoder [5].
4.3 Embedding Perturbation Study Results
Table 2: Perturbation Combinations Study Results
Averaged Across Stratified 4-Fold Cross Validation
P R F1
ID NCS CFS NCS CFS NCS CFS
0 0.9225 0.8585 0.9472 0.8010 0.9347 0.8287
1 0.9227 0.8453 0.9412 0.8028 0.9319 0.8235
2 0.9330 0.8382 0.9357 0.8321 0.9344 0.8351
3 0.9295 0.8424 0.9385 0.8220 0.9340 0.8321
4 0.9201 0.8641 0.9501 0.7938 0.9349 0.8275
5 0.9282 0.8547 0.9444 0.8173 0.9362 0.8356
6 0.9335 0.8445 0.9386 0.8329 0.9361 0.8386
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
pos
seg
tok
pos
seg
pos
tok
seg
tok pos seg tok
In Table 2, we see the results of perturbing the 3 different em-
bedding layers in BERT. From the results we conclude that setting
6 produces the best models for our task. Particularly, this setting
produces the best recall for the CFS class, which is arguably the
more important class. The sacrifice in recall, with respect to the
NCS class, compared to other settings is only ≈ 0.02 at most. While
setting 4 achieves the best performance in precision with respect to
the CFS class, the drop in recall for the CFS class makes it not viable.
Thus, from here on, any results dealing with adversarial training
will employ setting 6 and perturb only the tok embedding layer.
4.4 Classification Task, Ranking, and
Distribution Results
4.4.1 Classification Results. Our results are encapsulated in Table
3 and Table 4. We assume familiarity with the metrics, which are
defined in Section 7.2. In Table 3, we observe that the SVM based
model, CB-SVM, has the lowest performance across many measures.
This is expected, as the SVM can only capture the information
present in the dataset, while the deep learning models benefit from
outside knowledge afforded to them by either pre-trained word-
embeddings or a pre-trained model (i.e., BERT) that can be fine
tuned. The CB-BiL model shows modest improvements overall, but
it does achieve noticeably better CFS recall than the SVM model.
With respect to BERT-based architectures, both models outperform
CB-SVM and CB-BiL considerably. Between CB-BB and CB-BBA,
CB-BBA achieves the best performance across most of the metrics.
Although CB-BB has a better CFS recall and NFS precision, these dif-
ferences are minuscule and not enough for CB-BB to be considered
a better model. Ultimately, CB-BBA achieves a 4.70 point F1 score
improvement over the past state-of-the-art CB-BiL model, a
5.31 point F1-score improvement over the CB-SVM model, and a
0.96 point F1-score improvement over a regularly-trained BERT
model. This demonstrates the effectiveness of our new architecture
and training algorithm.
The results on the C2019 dataset are in Table 5. The metrics
presented for the CLEF competition teams are taken from [3], since
we could not find the source code to reproduce them. For this reason
we also cannot provide the P, R, F1, and nDCG for these teams. We
tested models trained on both the CBD and C2019 training set and
used the C2019 testing set to evaluate them. The models trained
on CBD and tested on the CLEF test set didn’t perform as well;
this was expected, given that our methodology of dataset labelling
differs significantly from CLEF’s. Despite this, when trained on
C2019, CB-BBA held its own when compared to the Copenhagen
model which was the winner of that competition only falling short
in the mAP metric by 0.0035.
4.4.2 nDCG Results. In Table 4 we observe that the best nDCG
score is achieved by the CB-BBA model, and the CB-BB and CB-BiL
models are within ≈ 61000 of it. The CB-SVM model has the “worst”
nDCG, but is still not far behind the deep learning models. It is
noteworthy that all models show relatively good performance on
this measure since the CFS class is less represented in the dataset.
4.4.3 Distribution of CWS Scores. To analyze the distribution of
our models’ outputs on a typical corpus of text, we process 100
sentences from the January 14th, 2020 Democratic presidential de-
bate. 28 The sentences were chosen so that there would be about
equal numbers of check-worthy and non-check-worthy sentences.
Figure 4 displays the results, which use Kernel Density Estimation
[40] to estimate the score distribution from discrete data points. Ob-
serving the density spikes around 0 and 1 on CB-BBA’s distribution,
we conclude that our model more clearly differentiates sentences
28 https://bit.ly/3bH4fL9
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Table 3: Precision, Recall, and F1 Averaged Across Stratified 4-Fold Cross Validation
Model P Pm Pw
R Rm Rw
F1 F1m F1w
NCS CFS NCS CFS NCS CFS
CB-SVM 0.8935 0.7972 0.8454 0.8660 0.9263 0.7240 0.8251 0.8685 0.9096 0.7588 0.8342 0.8665
CB-BiL 0.9067 0.7773 0.8420 0.8697 0.9123 0.7652 0.8387 0.8703 0.9095 0.7712 0.8403 0.8700
CB-BB 0.9344 0.8149 0.8747 0.9003 0.9239 0.8379 0.8809 0.8993 0.9291 0.8263 0.8777 0.8997
CB-BBA 0.9335 0.8445 0.8890 0.9081 0.9386 0.8329 0.8857 0.9084 0.9361 0.8386 0.8873 0.9082
Table 4: nDCG Averaged Across
Stratified 4-Fold Cross Validation
CB-SVM CB-BiL CB-BB CB-BBA
nDCG 0.9765 0.9817 0.9877 0.9894
Figure 4: Comparison of Check-Worthiness Score Distribu-
tions Using the CB-BBA and CB-SVM Models on 100 sen-
tences from the January 14th, 2020, Democratic presidential
debate.
as check-worthy or not check-worthy. The more well-delineated
distribution of the CB-BBA model also improves its interpretability
over CB-SVM.
5 RELATEDWORKS
In recent years, there have been several efforts with respect to build-
ing claim spotting models. ClaimBuster [16] is the first of several no-
table claim spotting models. Another team [11] extended CB-SVM
feature set 4.2 by including several contextual features such as: posi-
tion of the target sentence in its segment, speaker name, interaction
between opponents, etc. They created a dataset from the 2016 US
presidential and vice presidential debates and annotated sentences
by taking fact-checking outputs from 9 fact-checking organizations.
If a sentence was fact-checked by at least one fact-checking out-
let, it was labeled as check-worthy. A follow-up study [22] built
an online system, namely, ClaimRank 15 for prioritizing sentences
for fact-checking based on their check-worthiness score. Claim-
Rank is a re-implementation of the aforementioned study, but it
also supports Arabic by employing cross-language English-Arabic
embeddings. Another study [34] followed the same data annota-
tion strategy on a larger dataset by including sentences from an
additional 15 2016 U.S. primary debates. The authors developed
a multi-classifier based model called TATHYA that uses multiple
SVMs trained on different clusters of the dataset. The model takes
the output from the most confident classifier. The feature set used
was comprised of tf-idf weighted bag-of-unigrams, topics of the
sentences, part-of-speech tuples, and a count of entities.
Another effort by Konstantinovskiy et al. [26], which utilized
the expertise of professional fact-checkers, designed an annotation
schema and created a benchmark dataset for training a claim spot-
ting model. The authors trained the model using logistic regression
on top of dataset’s universal sentence representation derived from
InferSent [7]. Their model classifies a sentence as either checkable
or non-checkable. The authors also disagreed with ClaimBuster’s
and ClaimRank’s idea of a check-worthiness score. They believe
the decision of how important a claim is, should be left to the
professional fact-checkers. In the recent CLEF2019 competition
on check-worthiness detection, the Copenhagen team developed
the winning approach [14] which leveraged the semantic and syn-
tactic representation of each word in a sentence. They generated
domain-specific pretrained word embeddings that helped their sys-
tem achieve better performance in the competition. They used a
large weakly-labeled dataset, whose labels were assigned by Claim-
Buster, for training an LSTM model.
6 CONCLUSION
We have presented our work on detecting check-worthy factual
claims employing adversarial training on transformer networks.
Our results have shown that through our methods we have achieved
state-of-the-art results on two different datasets (i.e., CBD and
C2019). During the process we also re-vamped our dataset and ap-
proach to collecting and assigning labels for it. We have also come
to realize that the lack of a large standardized dataset holds this field
back, and thus we look forward to contributing and establishing
efforts to fix this situation. We plan on releasing different versions
of our dataset periodically in hopes that we can get more significant
community contributions with respect to expanding it. 29
In the future, we are interested in exploring adversarial training
as a defense against malicious adversaries. As a publicly deployed
API, ClaimBuster may be susceptible to exploitation without incor-
porating mechanisms that improve its robustness. For example, it
has been shown by [24] that a model’s classification can be strongly
influenced when certain words are replaced by their synonyms. We
are currently researching methods to combat similar weaknesses.
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7 REPRODUCIBILITY
7.1 Code Repositories, API, and Related
Projects
We provide an API of the claim-spotting algorithm online to show
its real-world usage at https://idir.uta.edu/claimbuster/api/docs/.
We are also releasing our code along with detailed instructions
on running and training our models. Our code and its documenta-
tion can be found at https://github.com/idirlab/claimspotter. Along
with these, we also present several projects which showcase how
ClaimBuster can and is currently being used:
• Claimspotting Presidential Debates
• End-to-End Fact-Checking
• Claimspotting Tweets
7.2 Formulas for Performance Measures
Precision (P):
P = TP
TP + FP
(11)
Recall (R):
R = TP
TP + FN
(12)
F1:
F1 = 2 × P × R
P + R
(13)
{P,R, F1} Macro (Pm , Rm , F1m ):
Mm =
1
|L|
∑
l ∈L
Ml
whereM ∈ {P ,R, F1} , and L ∈ {NCS,CFS}
(14)
{P,R, F1}Weighted (Pw , Rw , F1w ):
Mw =
1∑
l ∈L Nl
∑
l ∈L
Nl ×Ml
whereM ∈ {P ,R, F1} , L ∈ {NCS,CFS} , and
Nl is the number of samples whose ground truth label is l .
(15)
Mean Average Precision (MAP):
AP =
∑n
k=1 (P (k) × rel (k))
number of check-worthy claims
where P (k) is the precision at k, and rel (k) equals 1 if the
claim is check-worthy and 0 otherwise.
MAP =
∑Q
q AP (q)
Q
where Q is the number of queries.
(16)
Normalized Discounted Cumulative Gain (nDCG):
nDCGp =
∑p
i=1
2r eli −1
loд2(i+1)∑|RELp |
i=1
2r eli −1
loд2(i+1)
where reli ∈ {0, 1} is the CWS at position i , andRELp  represents the list of claims ordered by their
check-worthiness up to position p.
(17)
7.3 Datasets
We provide the CBD dataset, a collection of sentences labelled
manually in-house by high-quality coders, in our repository at
https://github.com/idirlab/claimspotter/tree/master/data. CBD was
curated to have NNCS = Y ×NCFS , forY = 2.5; where NNCS is the
number of non-check-worthy sentences and NCFS is the number of
check-worthy sentences. This was done after evaluating different
values of Y (i.e., Y ∈ {2, 2.5, 3}) and concluding the best ratio for
NCS to CFS was 2.5 : 1. The C2019 dataset, containing sentences
from the first and second presidential debates and the first vice
presidential debate from 2016, can be found at https://github.com/
clef2018-factchecking/clef2018-factchecking.
7.3.1 Contributing. We are always looking for collaborators to
contribute to the labelling of more data. Contributions will benefit
everyone as we plan on releasing periodic updates when a signifi-
cant amount of new labels are gathered. To contribute please visit
and make an account at: https://idir.uta.edu/classifyfact_survey/.
7.3.2 Dataset Labeling Criteria. The labels for the dataset are as-
signed by high-quality coders, which are participants that have a
pay-rate ≥ 5¢ and have labeled at least 100 sentences. The pay-
rate for a user is internally calculated by taking into account their
labeling quality, the average length of sentence a user labels, and
how many sentences a user skips. More specifically, we define the
quality (LQp ) of a coder (p) with respect to the screening sentences
they have labeled (SS(p)) as:
LQp =
∑
s ∈SS (p) γ l t
|SS(p)|
where γ l t is the weight factor when p labeled the screening sen-
tence s as l and the experts labeled it as t . Both l , t ∈ {NCS ,
CFS}. We set γ l t = −0.2 where l = t , γ l t = 2.5 where (l , t) ∈
{(NCS,CFS), (CFS,NCS)}. The weights are set empirically. The
pay-rate (Rp ) is then defined as:
Rp =
Lp
L
1.5
× (3 − 7 × LQp0.2 ) × 0.6
|SKIPp |
|ANSp |
where, L is the average length of all the sentences, Lp is the average
length of sentences labeled byp,ANSp is the set of sentences labeled
by p and SKIPp is the set of sentences skipped by p. The numerical
values in the above equation were set in such a way that it would
be possible for a participant to earn up to 10¢ per sentence. Using
this scheme, out of 581 users in our system, 69 users are considered
high-quality coders. A label is then only assigned to a particular
sentence if it has unanimously been assigned that label by at least 2
high-quality coders. More precisely, we defined the number of high-
quality labels needed as: X ∈ [NCS,CFS] ,∃X ∋ sX ≥ 2 ∧ sX =
sNCS +sCFS where, sX is the number of top-quality labels of typeX ,
and a top quality label is one that has been given by a high-quality
coder [15].
7.4 Hyperparameters
We provide Table 6 for major parameter settings used in the BBA,
BB, and BiLSTM claimspotting algorithm. The description of the
major parameters are as follows:
• cs_train_steps: number of epochs to run
• cs_lr: learning rate during optimiation
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Table 6: Major Parameters for Training
Parameter BBA BB
cs_train_steps 10 5
cs_lr 5e-5 5e-5
cs_kp_cls 0.7 0.7
cs_batch_size_reg 24 24
cs_batch_size_adv 12 -
cs_perturb_norm_length 2.0 -
cs_lambda 0.1 -
cs_combine_reg_adv_loss True -
cs_perturb_id 5 -
• cs_perturb_norm_length: norm length of adversarial pertur-
bation
• cs_kp_cls: keep probability of dropout in fully connected
layer
• cs_lambda: adversarial loss coefficient (eq. 10)
• cs_combine_reg_adv_loss: add loss of regular and adversar-
ial loss during training
• cs_batch_size_reg: size of the batch
• cs_batch_size_adv: size of the batch when adversarial train-
ing
• cs_perturb_id: index in Table 2
7.5 Evaluation and Training Final Models
We perform 4-fold cross validation to evaluate our models, selecting
the best model from each fold using the weighted F1-score (eq. 15)
calculated on the validation set. Therefore, in each iteration the
data is split as follows: 25% test, 7.5% validation, and 67.5% training.
The metrics produced at the end are based on the classifications
across all folds. We train the final models (for both CBD and C2019)
on the entire dataset for up to 10 epochs and select the best epoch
based on the weighted F1-score calculated on the validation set.
7.6 Hardware and Software Specifications
Our neural network models and training algorithms were writ-
ten in TensorFlow 2.1 [1] and run on machines with four Nvidia
GeForce GTX 1080Ti GPU’s. We did not parallelize GPU usage with
distributed training; each experiment was run on a single 1080Ti
GPU. The machines ran Arch Linux and had an 8-Core i7 5960X
CPU, 128GB RAM, 4TB HDD, and 256GB SSD.
